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Abstract:	 Thailand’s	 near-total	 elimination	 of	 opium	 poppy	 cultivation	 is	 attributed	 to	 “alternative	
development”	programming,	which	replaces	illicit	crops	with	licit	ones.	However,	opium	poppy	cultivation	
was	not	drastically	reduced	because	substitute	crops	earned	the	same	income	as	opium:	nothing	can	equal	
the	price	of	opium	 to	 smallholder	 farmers,	 especially	 those	without	 land	 tenure.	 Thailand’s	 reduction	 in	
poppy	 cultivation	 was	 achieved	 by	 the	 increased	 presence	 and	 surveillance	 capability	 of	 state	 security	
actors,	who,	 year	by	 year,	were	 able	 to	 locate	 and	destroy	 fields,	 and	 arrest	 cultivators,	with	 increasing	
accuracy.	This	coercion	was	also	accompanied	by	benefits	to	cultivators,	 including	the	provision	of	health	
and	education	services	and	the	extension	of	roads;	both	stick	and	carrot	constituted	the	encroachment	of	
the	Thai	 state.	The	provision	of	citizenship	 to	hill	 tribe	members	also	gave	 them	a	vested	 interest	 in	 the	
state,	 through	 their	 ability	 to	 hold	 land,	 access	 health	 care,	 education	 and	work	opportunities,	 amongst	
others.	These	initiatives	did	not	occur	without	costs	to	hill	tribe	cultures	for	whom	a	symbiotic	relationship	
with	 the	 land	 was	 and	 remains	 disrupted.	 These	 findings	 indicate	 that	 alternative	 development	
programming	 unlinked	 to	 broader	 state-building	 initiatives	 in	 Afghanistan,	 Myanmar	 and	 other	 opium	
poppy-producing	areas	will	fail,	because	short-term,	high-yield,	high	value,	imperishable	opium	will	remain	
the	most	logical	choice	for	poor	farmers,	especially	given	the	lack	of	a	farmer’s	vested	interest	in	the	state	
which	compels	them	to	reduce	their	income	whilst	offering	them	no	other	protections	or	services.	 	
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1.	Introduction	
Opium	poppy	cultivation	in	Thailand	fell	from	12,112	hectares	in	1961	to	281	ha	in	2015.	By	
most	standards	of	measurement,	the	country’s	“war”	on	drug	production	succeeded,	especially	in	
comparison	 to	 other	 drug-producing	 countries	 such	 as	 Afghanistan,	 Myanmar,	 Laos,	 Colombia,	
Peru,	 Bolivia	 and	 Mexico.	 The	 United	 Nations	 Office	 on	 Drugs	 and	 Crime	 (UNODC)	 declared	
Thailand	“opium	free”	a	decade	ago,	and	has	not	included	Thailand	in	its	World	Drugs	Report	since	
2008.	 Thailand	 is	 also	 widely	 heralded	 as	 a	 successful	 example	 of	 “alternative	 development”	
programming,	which	seeks	to	replace	illicit	crops	with	licit	ones,	and	which	is	conducted	in	tandem	
with	 coercive	 policies	 to	 eliminate	 the	 opium	 economy,	 comprised	 of	 poppy	 cultivation,	
refinement	into	opium,	conversion	to	heroin,	and	export.	
This	 paper	 analyses	 the	 historical	 success	 of	 alternative	 development	 in	 Northern	 Thailand	
and	 finds	 that	 opium	 poppy	 cultivation	 was	 not	 drastically	 reduced	 because	 substitute	 crops	
earned	the	same	income	as	opium:	nothing	can	equal	the	price	of	opium	to	smallholder	farmers,	
especially	those	without	land	tenure	and	the	consecutive	inability	to	securely	invest	in	longer-term	
crops.	Without	eradication,	opium	cultivation	 is	determined	by	market	 forces:	 in	1984,	 the	year	
eradication	began,	cultivation	was	again	peaking.	But	alternate	crops	did	provide	income,	aided	by	
a	market-distorting	price	 floor	 the	government	used	 to	make	up	 the	difference.	That	price	 floor	
remains.	The	near-total	 reduction	 in	opium	cultivation,	however,	was	aided	by	much	more	 than	
new	crops	and	price	guarantees.	The	era	of	eradication	was	heralded	by	the	increased	presence	of	
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state	 security	actors,	 enhanced	 law	enforcement	and	 surveillance,	 the	destruction	of	 crops,	 and	
the	arrest	of	cultivators.	But	this	coercion	was	also	accompanied	by	benefits	to	hill	tribes,	including	
the	 provision	 of	 health	 and	 education	 services,	 the	 extension	 of	 roads,	 the	 assignment	 of	 civil	
servants	to	administer	areas	they	were	previously	absent	from.	Both	stick	and	carrot	constituted	
the	encroachment	of	 the	Thai	 state.	The	provision	of	 citizenship	 to	hill	 tribe	members	also	gave	
them	a	vested	interest	in	the	state,	through	their	ability	to	hold	land,	access	health	care,	education	
and	work	opportunities,	and	bank	credit,	amongst	others.	These	initiatives	did	not	occur	without	
both	economic	and	cultural	costs	to	hill	tribe	cultures	for	whom	a	symbiotic	relationship	with	the	
land	was	and	remains	disrupted.	Far	from	being	a	standalone	historical	episode	unlinked	to	others,	
alternative	development	and	eradication	has	occurred	as	a	part	of	 the	 centuries-long	expansion	
and	consolidation	of	lowland	Thai	state	power	into	egalitarian	and	state-resistant	highland	areas	it	
was	 previously	 absent	 from.	 This	 paper	 therefore	 applies	 the	 theoretical	 frameworks	 of	 Van	
Schendel	(2002),	and	Scott	(2009)	toward	Thailand’s	contemporary	expansion	into	remote	areas	of	
Northwest	Thailand.	
These	 findings	 indicate	 that	 alternative	 development	 programming	 unlinked	 to	 broader	
state-building	initiatives	in	Afghanistan,	Myanmar	and	other	opium	poppy-producing	areas	will	fail,	
because	short-term,	high-yield,	high	value,	imperishable	opium	will	remain	the	most	logical	choice	
for	poor	farmers,	especially	given	the	lack	of	a	farmer’s	vested	interest	in	the	state	which	compels	
them	to	reduce	their	income	whilst	offering	them	no	other	protections	or	services.	
This	analysis	is	based	on	field	research	and	interviews	with	Thai	government	officials,	Hill	Tribe	
representatives,	 security	 actors,	 academics,	 civil	 society	 representatives,	 local	 businesspersons,	
ex-cultivators,	 and	 recovering	 opium	 addicts	 in	 Omkoi,	 Chiang	 Mai,	 and	 other	 areas,	 from	
December	 2015	 to	 June	 2016.	 These	 findings	 emerged	 from	 an	 earlier	 project	 at	 the	 National	
University	of	Singapore’s	Lee	Kuan	Yew	School	of	Public	Policy,	 in	collaboration	with	Chiang	Mai	
University	and	the	Government	of	Thailand’s	Office	of	the	Narcotics	Control	Board.	
2.	Prologue:	Lowland	Intrusions	in	Southeast	Asian	Highlands	
Put	vegetables	in	the	basket:	put	people	in	the	Muang	(village).	
-	Thai	saying	
Van	Schendel	 (2002)	 coined	 the	word	 “Zomia”	 to	describe	 the	upland	 southeast	Asian	 land	
massif	which	stretches	from	Vietnam	to	Tibet,	and	which	includes	Northwestern	Thailand:	an	area	
traditionally	resistant	to	centralized	rule	due	to	 its	high	elevation,	extensive	forest	cover,	rugged	
topography,	and	the	friction	which	results.	Unlike	monocropping	lowland	Thais,	Bamars	and	others	
who	often	cultivate	Padi	rice,	highlanders,	including	Thailand’s	Karen,	Akha,	Hmong,	Lahu,	and	Lisu,	
cultivate	a	wide	variety	of	crops	that	are	hard	to	seize	and	tax,	such	as	tubers.	Their	swiddening	
keeps	 them	 mobile,	 and	 their	 societies	 do	 not	 allow	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 centralized	 rule:	
egalitarianism	predominates	amongst	highlanders,	and	Myanmar’s	Kachin	would	go	so	far	as	to	kill	
emergent	leaders	who	seemed	too	ambitious	(Leach,	1954).	
Scott	 (2009),	Van	Schendel	 (2002)	and	others	postulate	that	much	of	the	Zomia	population,	
including	Karen,	migrated	to	the	hills	in	order	to	escape	from	the	centralizing	rule	of	lowland	and	
wet-rice	cultivating	states	that	sought	to	capture	and	transport	populations	near	to	wetland	rice	
producing	areas,	putting	 them	to	work	cultivating	monocrops	which	could	 then	be	 taken,	 taxed,	
and	 stored	 for	 long	 periods.	 In	 additional	 to	 monocropping,	 these	 lowland	 states	 were	
characterized	 by	 permanent	 settlements;	 uniformity	 of	 culture,	 language,	 and	 education;	 the	
propagation	 of	 dynastic	 myths	 to	 justify	 rule	 in	 cosmological	 terms;	 the	 record-keeping	 made	
possible	by	literacy;	the	levying	of	tax;	and	conscription	in	pursuit	of	all	of	the	above.	Such	states	
thrived,	to	the	benefit	or	emerging	elites	and	dynasties,	and	to	the	chagrin	of	captured	populations	
that	eventually	became	the	members	of	uniform	ethnicities	and	religious	groups.	The	Padi	 state	
which	caused	the	most	 flight	was	Han	China,	which	caused	wave	after	wave	of	non-Han	to	 flee,	
first	 from	 the	 river	 valleys	 of	 central	 China,	 and	 then	 from	 Sichuan	 and	 Yunnan,	 as	 changing	
dynasties	seized	more	land	and	people.	Those	who	did	not	flee	eventually	became	Han.	Tai	people	
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originally	fled	Han	expansion,	but	they	replicated	Han	practices	in	the	lowlands	they	settled	in,	and	
eventually	 the	 most	 successful	 of	 the	 Tai	 statelets,	 Thailand,	 posed	 the	 same	 threat	 to	 other	
highlanders	that	Han	once	posed	to	them	as	they,	and	their	lowland	Bamar	neighbors,	encroached	
upon	 the	 hills.	 Highlanders	 fleeing	 an	 expanded	 state	 did	 not	 only	 constitute	 the	 constructed	
ethnicities	of	highland	populations;	they	were	also	constituted	by	select	Bamar,	Han,	Tai	and	other	
lowlanders	who	sought	freedom	in	the	forests	and	hills.	
The	 lowland	 Thai	 state	 grew	 from	 struggles	with	 Khmer	 and	 Bamar	 neighbors	 that	warred	
against	 one	 another	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 populations	 rather	 than	 territories.	 Thailand’s	 position	
between	 French	 and	 British	 colonies	 served	 as	 a	 buffer	 between	 the	 two	 and	 so	 the	 state	
consolidated	 internally,	 expanding	 rule	 into	 peripheral	 and	 highland	 areas	 not	 claimed	 by	
European	powers.	 	
King	 Chulalongkorn,	 arguably	 the	 father	 of	 the	 contemporary	 Thai	 state,	 viewed	 highland	
tribes	paternally,	seeing	them	as	nak	anurak	or	benign	savages	(Renard,	2001);	he	also	regarded	
them	as	Thai	subjects.	Contemporary	authorities	may	regard	Karen	and	other	hill	 tribes	as	a	 less	
civilized	form	of	Thai,	but	they	regard	them	as	relatives	nonetheless.	This	attitude	of	benevolent	
superiority	has	percolated	into	much	of	the	civil	service1.	 	
3.	A	Brief	History	of	Opium	in	Southeast	Asia	
The	opium	poppy	(papaver	somniferum)	is	indigenous	to	the	eastern	Mediterranean,	and	was	
first	described	by	Hippocrates.	From	Anatolia	its	cultivation	spread	to	the	Balkans,	Iran,	India	and	
China,	where	it	was	first	used	as	medicine	a	millennia	ago.	 	
Refugees	 entering	 highland	 southeast	 Asia	 in	 flight	 from	 Han	 Chinese	 expansion	 and	
successive	 failed	 rebellions	 likely	 brought	 opium	 poppy	 with	 them	 from	 Sichuan	 and	 Yunnan,	
where	 it	was	 long	cultivated	and	consumed,	by	Hmong	and	Lisu	 in	particular2,	but.	Opium	usage	
became	incorporated	into	the	hill	tribe	cultures	of	Southwest	China,	Northern	Thailand,	Northern	
Laos,	and	Northwest	Myanmar,	as	a	 social	and	a	 religious	activity.	Opium	was	used	as	currency;	
many	products	were	until	recently	priced	in	joi	of	opium.	Opium	was	also	a	means	to	store	wealth:	
unlike	other	crops,	it	travels	well,	and	can	be	stored	for	long	periods	without	degrading.	It	became	
a	representation	of	stability,	continuity,	and	wealth,	its	seed	given	by	parents	as	wedding	gifts	to	
children	leaving	the	household.	Opium	was	also	broad-spectrum	medicine	for	a	variety	of	physical	
and	mental	ailments,	its	persistence	enhanced	by	the	remoteness	of	many	highland	communities	
to	other	treatment	options.	It	reduces	hunger	pangs.	Lastly—or	perhaps	firstly—people	like	to	get	
high.	
British	India	seized	upon	opium	as	their	opportunity	to	“right”	the	balance	of	trade	issue	with	
China,	and	India’s	chronic	shortage	of	silver,	by	exporting	opium	to	China	and	other	markets.	Later	
waves	of	Chinese	labor	migration	to	Southeast	Asia’s	British	and	French	colonies	as	well	as	Siam	in	
the	19th	and	20th	centuries	brought	their	addiction	with	them.	The	Thai	King	Rama	II	first	banned	
opium	in	1811,	but	Siam	ultimately	bowed	to	British	pressure;	Rama	IV	 legalized	opium	again	(it	
would	not	become	 illegal	 again	until	 1958)	 instituted	a	government	opium	monopoly.	The	 state	
benefitted:	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century,	monopolies	on	opium,	alcohol	and	gambling	constituted	
at	least	40%	of	Thai	government	revenue	(Lintner,	2000).	Whilst	opium	was	wholly	imported	from	
British	India,	the	possibility	of	cultivating	opium	outside	state	monopolies	and	selling	at	monopoly	
prices	was	 soon	 acted	 upon	 by	 traders,	 corrupt	 officials,	 and	 holders	 of	monopoly	 concessions.	
Highlanders	were	encouraged	to	plant	more	opium,	which	they	would	exchange	for	rice.	This	also	
occurred	in	China,	with	illicit	opium	cultivated	in	Yunnan	finding	its	way	into	the	Thai	drug	market.	
The	 British	 increased	 opium	 cultivation	 in	 Shan	 state,	 which	 borders	 NW	 Thailand,	 after	 they	
absorbed	Myanmar	into	India	in	three	stages	of	conquest.	 	
Opium	 cultivation	 in	 Thailand	 did	 not	 begin	 in	 earnest	 until	 the	 1940s.	 The	 fall	 of	 China’s	
Guomindang	(Kuomintang,	hereafter	KMT)	to	the	communists	in	1949	led	to	the	remnants	of	the																																																									
1	 Interviews,	 ONCB,	 Chian	 Mai	 &	 Omkoi,	 December	 2015/	 March	 2016.	 Many	 government	 interviewees	
regard	their	work	as	a	civilizing	mission.	
2	 Interviews,	villagers,	CRSPO,	ONCB,	Mae	Tuen/	Omkoi	town,	Omkoi,	March	2016.	
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KMT	fleeing	to	Myanmar,	where	they	expanded	cultivation	of	the	only	cash	crop	in	northern	Shan-	
opium,	which	would	 reach	 international	markets	 via	 Bangkok.	 Systematic	 cultivation	 percolated	
into	Thailand	with	highlanders	fleeing	KMT	conscription	and	taxation	(McCoy,	1973,	Lintner,	1999);	
Thailand’s	 hill	 tribes	 in	 remote	 areas	 became	 the	 primary	 cultivators	 of	 the	 crop,	 although	 the	
profit	 accrued	 elsewhere,	 with	 KMT	 and	 Chiu	 Chau3	 Chinese	 networks.	 Demand	 for	 Southeast	
Asian	 opium	 exponentially	 increased	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 success	 of	 eradication	 programs	 in	 the	
Balkans,	Anatolia,	and	Iran;	organized	criminal	syndicates	searched	for	new	sources	of	opium,	and	
found	it	in	the	Golden	Triangle	(McCoy,	1973).	In	Thailand,	this	illegal	economy	operated	with	the	
implicit	involvement	of	the	Thai	police	and	army	that	fought	one	another	over	control	of	the	trade;	
despite	the	illegality	of	the	substance,	law	enforcement	did	not	begin	until	1984	(see	below).	Hill	
Tribe	 swiddening	 (or	 pejoratively,	 “slash-and-burn”)	 agriculture	 (Thai:	 Rai	Mun	Wian;	 Burmese:	
Taungya),	 historically	 a	 sustainable	 farming	 practice	 practiced	 by	 highlanders,	mutated	 into	 the	
clearance	of	entire	hillsides	for	poppy	in	Shan	and	northwest	Thailand.	Thai	communist	insurgents	
also	 profited	 from	 this	 trade;	 highlanders	 were	 their	 farmers	 and	 foot	 soldiers.	 Opium	 became	
central	to	the	dominant	lowland	Thai	discourse	on	hill	tribes.	It	was	in	this	era	especially	that,	for	
many	 lowland	 Thai,	 highlanders—swiddeners,	 opium	 growers,	 traffickers,	 rebels—became	
associated	with	 environmental	 destruction,	 crime,	 and	 threat.	 These	 stereotypes,	 which	 do	 not	
stand	 up	 to	 even	 casual	 scrutiny.	 have	 created	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 suspicion	 and	 distrust	 which	
continues	to	color	the	lowland	–	hill	tribe	relationship.	
4.	The	“War	on	Drugs”	and	the	advent	of	Alternative	Development	
Northern	Thailand’s	opium	economy	began	to	wane	in	the	early	1970’s,	when	United	States	
President	Richard	Nixon	declared	a	“War	on	Drugs”	in	response	to	a	rising	urban	heroin	epidemic	
which	 was	 partly	 fueled	 by	 addicted	 American	 soldiers	 returning	 from	 Vietnam.	 The	 Thai	
government,	 with	 US	 pressure	 and	 funding,	 began	 treating	 opium	 as	 an	 illegal	 substance	 and	
poppy	 as	 an	 illegal	 crop.	 Elements	 of	 the	 Thai	 state	 once	 involved	 in	 cultivation	 and	 trafficking	
began	their	own	disentanglement	at	this	time.	The	government	increased	the	scale	of	alternative	
livelihoods	 programs	 which	 had	 initially	 begun	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 Thai	 King	 Bhumibol	
Adulyadej’s	 Royal	 Project	 (est.	 1969).	 The	 Royal	 Project’s	 approach	 to	 alternative	 livelihoods	
included:	 	
1. Research	 and	 development	 of	 geographically	 suitable	 alternative	 crops	 which	 would	 not	
compete	with	lowland	products;	
2. Agricultural	extension	services	including	provision	of	seeds,	fertilizer,	training,	and	construction	
of	supporting	infrastructure	(dams,	irrigation,	farm	feeder	roads,	etc.);	 	
3. Post-harvest	 and	 value-added	 processes,	 such	 as	 transportation,	 grading	 and	 packing,	 food	
processing,	market	development,	etc.	
While	the	United	Nations	Development	Program,	working	alongside	the	Royal	Project,	initially	
managed	many	alternative	development	programs	on	behalf	of	the	state	(Renard,	2001),	the	Thai	
Government	 soon	 created	 a	 specialized	 agency,	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Narcotics	 Control	 Board	
(hereafter	 ONCB),	 to	 oversee	 Thailand’s	 drug	 control	 policy,	 alternative	 livelihoods	 and	 (later)	
eradication	in	particular.	In	line	with	the	implicit	mission	of	alternative	development	as	an	exercise	
in	 the	 consolidation	 of	 state	 power	 and	 the	 weakening	 of	 threats	 to	 the	 state,	 the	 ONCB	
established	its	first	five	regional	offices	in	Communist	Party	of	Thailand	(CPT)	insurgent	strongholds	
(Race,	 1974),	where	 they	worked	 as	 extension	 agents4:	 earlier	 state	 prohibitions	 on	 swiddening	
and	logging	made	many	Highlanders	eager	CPT	recruits.	
The	Royal	Project	introduced	over	150	new	crops	to	opium	poppy	farmers,	including	Arabica	
coffee	and	tea.	Other	less-valuable	crops	included	apples,	beans,	cabbage,	corn,	decorative	flowers,	
herbs	 (seasoning),	 lettuce,	 peaches,	 and	 so	 on.	 Padi	 rice	 was	 also	 encouraged.	 Issues	 arose:	
cabbage	cultivation	was	surprisingly	a	better	earner	than	opium	but	only	when	farmers	over-used	
chemical	fertilizers	and	pesticides	 	 (Renard,	2001),	and	only	in	the	first	year	of	cultivation;	prices																																																									
3	 alt:	Chao	Chu	/	Teochew	/	Chaozhou	
4	 Interviews,	ONCB,	Chiang	Mai,	December	2015.	
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soon	 crashed,	 and	 chemicals	 were	 soon	 banned	 due	 to	 the	 contamination	 of	 water	 sources	 in	
watershed	 areas.	 The	 same	happened	with	 tomatoes;	 these	 initial	 failures	 caused	many	 former	
opium	cultivators	to	abandon	the	project5.	
The	 government	 established	 price	 floors	 for	 alternative	 crops	 and	 became	 the	 guaranteed	
buyer	 for	 Royal	 Project	 produce,	 in	 order	 to	match	 the	 price	 farmers	 once	 earned	 from	 opium	
poppy	 cultivation.	 The	 Royal	 Project	 initially	 focused	 on	 monocropping,	 which	 served	 to	 make	
highland	participants	more	reliant	on	the	cash	which	their	monocrop	could	earn,	which	they	could	
then	 use	 for	 further	 nutritional	 diversification.	 This	 was	 an	 aspect	 of	 lowland	 “best	 practices”	
transplanted	 to	 an	 area	which	was	 not	 appropriate	 for	 it,	 and	 the	Royal	 Project	 de-emphasized	
monocropping	after	the	first	decade6.	
Poppy	eradication	did	not	begin	until	1984,	simultaneous	to	disarming	and	demobilizing	(and,	
in	the	Pieng	Luang	area,	killing)	the	last	vestiges	of	KMT	forces	on	Thai	territory,	as	well	as	expelling	
Khun	Sa.	This	was	a	full	15	years	after	alternative	development	began,	when	suitable	alternative	
crops	were	in	place;	the	ONCB	coordinated	eradication	efforts	which	were	primarily	conducted	by	
the	 3rd	 Army.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 crops,	 authorities	 began	 actively	 arresting	
cultivators.	 Between	 1984	 and	 1985,	 Thailand’s	 area	 under	 cultivation	 dropped	 from	 8,290	 to	
2,428	Ha	 (Renard,	 2001),	 and	accordingly	 rose	 in	Myanmar7,	where	 the	opium	harvest,	 from	an	
average	 of	 300-400,000	 KG	 per	 year,	 would	 peak	 at	 1,500,000	 KG	 in	 the	 mid-1990s;	 this	 peak	
coincided	 with	 government	 ceasefires	 with	 numerous	 highland	 insurgents	 emerging	 from	 the	
collapsed	Communist	Party	of	Burma.	The	new	groups,	especially	Wa	and	Kokang,	were	then	able	
to	concentrate	on	drug	production.	Cultivation	also	shifted	to	Laos,	peaking	at	126,654	KG	in	the	
1990s.	 	
Cultivation	 persisted,	 however,	 in	 remote	 areas	 which	 the	 state	 had	 difficulty	 accessing	 or	
maintaining	a	presence	in.	The	evasion	strategies	cultivators	developed	resulted	in	staggered	crops	
which	sprouted	on	those	same	plots	destroyed	by	the	army,	weeks	after	they	departed.	A	poppy	
growth	 cycle	 is	 roughly	 3	 months,	 but	 the	 annual	 opium-planting	 season	 is	 8	 months;	 several	
overlapping	planting	cycles	occurred.	New	poppy	fields	were	established	further	from	settlements;	
no	 information	 connected	 cultivator	 to	 crop	 unless	 they	were	 apprehended	 on	 site.	 Plots	 grew	
smaller,	ultimately	averaging	0.25	Ha.	Planting	occurred	on	steep	slopes,	difficult	 to	detect	 from	
spotter	planes	(and	later,	satellite	imagery).	Even	today	there	remain	areas	that	the	state	cannot	
see.	The	friction	of	terrain	remains	as	important	now	as	it	was	in	colonial	times.	 	
Harm	Reduction	was	 also	 a	 late	 addition	 to	 Thailand’s	 drug	 control	 policy.	 Thailand’s	 initial	
response	to	its	multifaceted	drug	problem	was	driven	by	foreign,	primarily	American,	concerns.	As	
the	 problem	 was	 considered	 international	 and	 not	 local,	 the	 Thai	 government’s	 approach	
concentrated	 only	 on	 the	 elimination	 of	 supply.	 Only	 in	 the	 1990s	 did	 Thai	 drug	 control	 policy	
begin	to	address	issues	of	local	addiction,	firstly	of	heroin	(which	for	a	brief	period	in	the	1980s	and	
1990s	 exploded	 in	 young	highland	populations,	Hmong	 in	 particular,	 before	AIDS	 just	 as	 rapidly	
killed	the	highland	injecting	population),	and	secondly	of	opium:	authorities	belatedly	noted	that	
grassroots	 farmers	of	opium	poppy	were	also	consumers	of	a	culturally	acceptable	product,	and	
therefore	demand	required	addressing	as	well	as	supply	(Anderson	et	al.,	2016).	Over	the	course	of	
alternative	livelihoods	and	eradication,	rehabilitation	and	harm	reduction	services	grew	in	demand	
																																																								
5	 Interviews	with	project	participants,	Nong	Tao,	June	24,	2016,	and	with	ONCB,	June	21,	2016.	 	
6	 Interview,	Phaw	Luang	Jorni	Odochao,	Nong	Tao,	Chiang	Mai,	June	24,	2016.	
7	 By	the	late	1980s	Myanmar	was	the	world’s	largest	supplier	of	heroin,	which	was	also	used	as	a	currency	
because	of	a	collapse	 in	the	value	of	 the	Kyat.	Afghanistan	would	soon	surpass	Myanmar:	US	government	
pressure	on	Myanmar’s	 State	 Law	and	Order	Restoration	Council	 to	 crack	down	on	heroin-manufacturing	
insurgents,	most	 notably	 Khun	 Sa’s	Mong	 Tai	 Army.	 The	world	 epicenter	 of	 poppy	 cultivation	 and	 heroin	
manufacture	 soon	 shifted	 to	 Afghanistan,	 where	 the	Mujahideen	 group	 Hizb	 e	 Islami	 began	 synthesizing	
heroin	in	Helmand	after	the	Soviet	withdrawal	in	1989.	The	Taliban’s	declaration	of	heroin	manufacture	as	
haram	or	forbidden	in	the	late	1990s	caused	cultivation	to	shift	back	to	Myanmar.	
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due	to	the	reduction	in	heroin	and	opium	supply	throughout	the	1990s:	qualitatively	this	is	visible,	
but	figures	are	unavailable8.	 	
Historical	Experiences	with	Alternative	Livelihoods:	Doi	Laan,	Chiangrai	
“Doesn’t	the	state	have	a	responsibility	to	protect	us,	to	not	let	us	be	taken	advantage	of?”	
-	Mimi	Saeju	Win9	
The	 experience	 of	 Doi	 Laan	 is	 emblematic	 of	 the	 wider	 disruption	 in	 cultures	 and	 economies	
caused	by	alternative	development	and	eradication.	Doi	Lann	is	a	Lisu	village	in	Chiangrai	province.	
The	majority	of	Lisu	 there	were	 involved	 in	opium	cultivation	and	sale.	Alternative	development	
projects	began	in	the	early	1970’s	but	opium	remained	the	mainstay	of	the	village	economy	until	
1985,	when	the	military	arrived.	Mimi	Saeju	Win	was	a	child	at	the	time;	she	recounted	the	arrival	
of	helicopters,	 followed	by	uniformed	men	in	trucks.	Doi	Laan’s	people	fled	 into	the	forest	while	
their	 crops	 were	 torched.	 The	 Royal	 Project	 and	 a	 German	 bilateral	 development	 project	
introduced	tomatoes	and	cabbages	but	the	Lisu	quickly	fell	under	the	sway	of	lowlanders	who	paid	
below-market	prices	and	then	cashed	in	on	the	guaranteed	price	floor	paid	by	the	Royal	Project.	
Farmers	 switched	 entirely	 to	 Arabica,	 and	 grow	 it	 because	 it	 takes	 less	 effort,	 even	 though	 the	
price	is	still	fixed	by	middlemen	at	20	to	25	baht	per	kilo.	
Eradication,	for	the	Lisu,	was	a	significant	cultural	and	economic	disruption;	opium	was	the	surest	
sign	of	wealth	in	Lisu	society.	Mimi	notes	that	Lisu	women	lost	much	of	their	household	authority	
at	the	onset	of	eradication:	women	served	as	opium	business	managers	and	traders,	and	the	loss	
in	 income	 from	 alternative	 crops	 affected	 their	 status.	 Doi	 Laan’s	 men	 became	 unhinged	 as	
household	 incomes	 plummeted.	 Alcoholism	 increased,	 as	 did	 use	 of	 heroin,	 amphetamine-like	
stimulants	(ALS),	and	prostitution;	injection	and	prostitution	heralded	an	HIV	epidemic	that	swept	
Doi	 Laan	beginning	 in	 the	early	1990s.	Many	Lisu	previously	 involved	 in	opium	began	 smuggling	
ALS	from	Wa	and	Kokang	areas	of	Shan	state,	Myanmar,	into	Thailand,	and	a	number	of	these	Lisu	
smugglers	and	dealers	were	executed	during	Thaksin	Shinawatra’s	“war	on	drugs”	in	2003.	
Interviewees	note	that,	if	many	Lisu	and	other	hill	tribes	had	a	choice,	they	would	cultivate	opium	
poppy	again.	
5.	Contemporary	Impact	of	past	policy	
The	 success	of	 the	overall	 alternative	 livelihoods	and	crop	 substitution	program	 in	Thailand	
did	 not	 result	 from	 substitute	 crops	 increasing	 incomes;	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 eradication	 and	
increased	law	enforcement/	state	surveillance,	and	the	potential	loss	of	both	income	and	freedom,	
were	primary	factors	in	the	decisions	of	former	cultivators	to	switch	crops10.	In	order	to	conquer	a	
place,	one	must	first	map	its	people	(Anderson,	2006;	Scott,	1998;	Scott,	2009;	Winichakul,	1994).	
This	is	doubly	true	when	a	stateless	area’s	resources	are	utilized	by	a	stateless	people	in	a	manner	
different	 from	 what	 the	 state	 intends;	 contestations	 over	 resources	 are	 implicit	 challenges	 to	
legitimacy.	 The	 state’s	 bureaucracy	 and	 coercive	 authority	 led	 to	 changes	 more	 than	 any	 new	
crops—none	of	which	provided	the	same	level	of	income	that	opium	poppy	cultivation	did.	But	the	
price	 floor	 established	 by	 the	 Royal	 Project	 partially	 bridged	 the	 gap	 between	 illicit	 and	 licit	
income.	The	Royal	Project	continues	to	pay	inflated	prices	for	substitute	crops.																																																									
8	 Interview,	public	health	official,	Omkoi,	March	2016.	
9	 Interview,	Mimi	Saeju	Win,	Chiang	Mai,	June	22,	2016.	
10	 Interviews	with	former	cultivators,	Mae	Tuen,	Feb	2016;	with	ONCB	officials,	Chiang	Mai,	Dec	2015-	June	
2016;	with	Mimi	Saeju	Win,	Chiang	Mai,	June	22,	2016;	with	Phaw	Luang	Jorni	Odochao,	Nong	Tao,	Chiang	
Mai,	June	24,	2016.	
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Citizenship:	An	important	factor	in	the	success	of	alternative	livelihoods,	according	to	Renard	
(2001)	and	others,	was	the	awarding	of	Thai	citizenship	to	hill	tribe	members:	citizenship	offered	
the	 possibility	 of	 land	 tenure.	 Encouraging	 crop	 substitution	 is	 implicitly	 an	 encouragement	 in	
long-term	investment,	particularly	for	estate	crops	such	as	coffee,	tea,	and	orchard	fruits.	Arabica	
coffee	is	a	good	example;	it	grows	at	the	same	altitude	as	opium,	travels	well,	offers	better	returns	
compared	to	short-term	crops,	and	it	requires	the	shade	of	larger	trees,	so	deforestation	is	not	an	
issue:	 it	 is	 an	 ideal	 alternate	 crop.	 But	 Arabica	 takes	 at	 least	 3	 years	 to	 reach	 maturity	 for	
harvesting.	Providing	 this	 tenure	 to	 farmers	encouraged	 them	 to	 shift	 away	 from	an	 illegal	 crop	
with	a	short	cultivation	window	and	a	high	rate	of	return	by	giving	them	the	security	of	knowing	
they	would	not	be	expelled	from	the	land	they	cultivated.	In	areas	designated	as	protected	by	the	
Royal	 Forestry	 Department	 (see	 below),	 limited	 tenure	was	 also	 allowed,	 sometimes	 grudgingly	
(Renard,	2001).	Citizenship	gives	 those	who	hold	 it	 a	 vested	 interest	 in	 the	 state	and	 its	 laws;	 it	
provides	minimum	levels	of	security	and	protection,	even	in	areas	where	the	rule	of	law	is	still	in	
adaptive	 phases.	 In	 Thailand’s	 evolving	 state-citizen	 compact,	 it	 provides	 free	 education	 and	
subsidized	 health	 care.	 It	 allows	 ownership	 of	 land	 and	 access	 to	 credit,	 and	 is	 necessary	 for	
longer-term	investments.	The	further	one	enters	remaining	contemporary	opium	cultivation	areas	
(such	as	Omkoi-	see	below),	the	larger	the	percentage	of	the	population	lacks	it.	 	
Roads	 and	 electricity:	 The	 impact	 of	 crop	 substitution	 cannot	 be	 disentangled	 from	 other	
forms	 of	 development,	 namely	 road	 building,	 followed	 by	 electrification.	 Roads	 served	 a	 dual	
purpose:	to	transport	administrators	and	security	actors	in,	and	transport	substitute	crops	out	with	
as	little	damage	to	the	product	as	possible	before	it	arrived	at	market.	
Crop	substitution	and	the	end	of	Swiddening:	The	alternative	 livelihoods	model,	 focused	on	
static	 agriculture	 and	 livestock,	 was	 antithetical	 to	 highland	 swiddening	 traditions:	 while	
alternative	 development	 was	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 opium	 poppy,	 it	 implicitly	 targeted	
swiddening	 as	 well.	 Alternative	 development	 projects	 largely	 ended	 the	 symbiotic	 relationship	
between	hill	tribe	swiddeners	and	forests.	And	in	the	areas	it	was	successful,	it	changed	the	very	
reason	why	highlanders	cultivated	crops:	from	household	unit	consumption	to	sale	in	markets.	 	
The	Royal	Forestry	Department	was	 initially	created	 to	protect	and	 regulate	Thailand’s	 teak	
supply	 in	 the	 late	1800s,	after	highland	Karen	began	“illegally”	selling	teak	to	the	British	 in	Shan	
and	the	French	in	Laos.	At	that	time	all	forests	were	declared	the	property	of	the	state.	Ironically,	
RFD	 can	be	historically	 implicated	 in	 the	 introduction	of	opium	 to	Karen	 in	Nong	Tao	and	other	
areas	of	Chiang	Mai:	they	banned	Karen	from	growing	rice,	which	would	have	required	large-scale	
forest	 clearing,	 but	 allowed	 them	 to	 grow	opium,	which	 required	much	 less	 clearing.	 The	Karen	
would	trade	the	opium	for	 the	rice	they	were	prohibited	from	growing	directly;	 the	government	
taxed	the	trade	as	well.	RFD’s	mandate	expanded	into	watershed	conservation	as	Thailand’s	forest	
cover	declined	from	53.33%	to	30.92%	of	overall	 land	area	between	1960	and	2006	(Ongprasert,	 	
2011).	 RFD’s	 policing	 of	 forest	 subcontracted	 Thai	 demand	 for	 forest	 products	 into	 Myanmar	
(Smith,	1994),	Karen	National	Union	areas	in	particular11.	Since	its	inception,	the	RFD	has	been	at	
loggerheads	 with	 hill	 tribes,	 denouncing	 and	 seeking	 to	 end	 swiddening,	 which	 it	 and	 other	
agencies	uniformly	oppose	under	the	mistaken	impression	that	it	 is	environmentally	harmful	and	
leads	to	large-scale	deforestation,	while	all	available	studies	demonstrate	that	it	is	a	rejuvenating	
practice12	 (Asia	 Indigenous	People’s	Alliance,	2012;	Bruun	et	al.,	2009;	Erni,	2009;	 Laungaramsri,	
2005).	 Karen	 leader	 Phaw	 Luang	 Jorni	 Odochao	 notes	 a	 particular	 irony:	 “The	 Thai	 government	
blames	us	 for	deforestation.	But	where	Karen	 live,	 there	are	 forests;	where	Thais	 live,	 there	are	
none."	Further,	 the	wholesale	 land	clearances	by	KMT,	Hmong,	Lisu	and	others	 in	 the	heyday	of	
opium	cultivation	was	not	 swiddening,	but	 for	many	 lowlanders,	 the	practices	were	one	and	the	
same.	While	opium	cultivation	declined,	so	did	swiddening.																																																									
11	 Interview,	 KNU	 representative	U	Mam	Char,	 Taung	Galay,	 Kayin	 State,	Myanmar,	 December	 2016.	 The	
KNU	has	recently	declared	a	moratorium	on	forestry	in	its	areas,	and	signed	an	MoU	with	the	World	Wildlife	
Foundation	(Irrawaddy,	2016).	
12	 This	would	change	if	the	populations	practicing	it	increased,	but	anecdotally,	the	opposite	occurred,	with	
younger	generations	seeking	livelihoods	other	than	shifting	agricultural	practice.	
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However,	the	RFD	was	forced	to	adapt	to	the	wishes	of	the	Royal	Project.	Were	they	given	a	
free	hand	they	may	have	simply	expelled	highlanders	from	the	areas	they	were	tasked	to	protect,	
at	the	Conservation	Law	which	defined	RFD	duties	had	declared	vast	swathes	of	highland	territory	
“protected	forest”,	in	which	human	habitation	was	illegal,	even	though	numerous	settlements	and	
peoples	pre-dated	the	law.	According	to	the	late	King	Bhumibol	Adulyadej	“in	national	forests	that	
the	authorities	declare	to	be	reserved	or	restricted,	people	have	long	been	there.	It	 is	strange	to	
enforce	the	law	against	people	who	live	in	such	areas,	which	have	always	been	non-reserved,	but	
only	 lately	declared	 reserved	because	of	 some	 lines	drawn	on	paper.	 The	problem	occurs	when	
those	boundaries	are	drawn,	causing	the	people	inhabiting	those	areas	to	become	“lawbreakers”.	
In	 terms	 of	 legislation,	 they	may	 be	 seen	 to	 violate	 the	 law,	 because	 the	 law	 is	 legally	 passed.	
However,	if	we	consider	the	issue	naturally	as	to	who	is	actually	breaking	the	law,	it	becomes	clear	
that	the	lawmakers	are,	because	the	people	lived	in	the	area	long	before	the	law	was	enacted13.”	
The	king	forced	a	compromise:	swiddening	would	end,	but	populations	would	remain.	
The	conflict	between	RFD	and	the	hill	tribes	continues	in	2017,	with	RFD/	DNP	continuing	to	
remove	Karen,	Hmong,	Lisu	and	others	 from	 lands	 they	have	dwelt	 in	 for	centuries.	The	current	
Thai	junta,	the	National	Council	for	Peace	and	Order	(NCPO),	issued	order	64/2014	to	protect	and	
restore	 existing	 forests;	 shortly	 after,	 the	 NCPO	 issued	 order	 66/2014,	 to	 shield	 the	 poor	 from	
t64/2014.	However,	DNP	seems	to	have	embraced	the	former	and	ignore	the	latter.	 	
With	the	passing	of	King	Bhumibol,	a	significant	restraint	on	the	RFD	and	DNP	may	have	been	
lifted.	
Nutrition:	The	nutritional	diversification	accompanying	former	swiddening	techniques	ended	
due	to	monocropping	substitution,	and	rural	food	security	declined	as	a	consequence.	This	is	the	
opposite	 of	 claims	 made	 by	 alternative	 development	 practitioners14	 who	 assert	 that	 the	 cash	
earned	 from	 monocropping	 allows	 for	 the	 purchase	 of	 varied	 foodstuffs	 which	 were	 once	
cultivated.	 The	market	price	of	 a	monocrop,	however,	 is	 volatile,	 especially	 for	high-value	 crops	
such	as	coffee,	and	so	a	collapse	in	its	price	signifies	a	collapse	in	household	purchasing	power,	and	
therefore,	 a	 collapse	 in	 the	 collapse	 of	 a	 food	 supply	 which	 was	 previously	 a	 constant.	 This	
reduction	in	food	security	is	not	quantitatively	measureable	due	to	a	lack	of	preserved	data	from	
past	 projects	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 previous	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation,	 but	 Karen	 and	 other	 hill	 tribe	
interviewees	who	experienced	this	attested	to	it.	 	
Increasing	 dependence	 on	markets	 and	 out-migration:	 The	 reduction	 in	 swiddening	 further	
integrated	highland	cultivators	into	Thailand’s	“cash”	(non-opium)	economy,	thus	increasing	their	
dependence	on	the	state	and	its	markets,	and	necessitating	non-traditional	forms	of	work	paid	in	
currency.	 This	 integration	 also	 encouraged	 seasonal	 and	 sometimes	 permanent	 migration	 of	
highlanders	 to	 towns	and	cities,	often	 for	construction	and	other	casual	 labor:	 in	many	highland	
areas,	 remittances	 became	 the	 primary	 income	 streams	 for	 cash-based	 needs.	 Select	 Chiangrai	
activists	make	a	connection	between	declining	opium	cultivation	and	increasing	trafficking	in	tribal	
women	to	brothels	in	the	south,	but	this	is	anecdotal.	
Gender	 imbalances:	 The	 end	 of	 opium	 cultivation	 also	 instigated	 a	 disruption	 in	 gender	
relations	amongst	tribes	such	as	Lisu.	Hutheesing	(1989)	reported	that,	among	the	Lisu	she	 lived	
with	in	the	early-	to	mid-	1980s,	women’s	traditional	roles	as	money	managers	for	opium	incomes	
were	disrupted,	with	significant	negative	impacts	on	their	status	in	the	village.	Opium	was	central	
to	 Lisu	 life,	Hutheesing	 (ibid.)	and	others	note15,	 and	 the	enforced	absence	of	 it	 resulted	 in	high	
rates	 of	 infidelity,	 alcoholism,	 amphetamine	 and	 heroin	 abuse,	 with	 resultant	 increasing	 HIV	
transmission	in	Lisu	villages.	 	
Other	 Impacts:	Hill	 tribes	 saw	alternative	development	as	 an	 imposition	 from	Bangkok	 that	
stripped	them	of	their	culture	and	sought	to	turn	them	into	caricatures	of	lowland	Thais	(Jantakad	
and	 Carson,	 1998;	 Renard,	 2001):	 they	were	 the	 passive	 recipients	 of	 such	 programs,	 and	 their																																																									
13	 From	a	speech	given	by	King	Bhumibol	Adulyadej,	June	27,	1973.	Translation	by	Patamawadee	Jongruck.	 	
14	 Interview,	HRDI,	Chiang	Mai,	March	2016.	
15	 Interview,	Lisu	activist,	Chiang	Mai,	June	22,	2016.	
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voices	played	no	 role	 in	 the	 shaping	of	 them;	nor	did	 they	 choose	which	new	 crops	 they	might	
cultivate.	 	
All	 of	 these	 impacts	 led	Margaret	Mead	 and	 other	 anthropologists	 to	 condemn	 alternative	
livelihood	programming,	erroneously	alleging	a	cultural	genocide	(Washburn,	1998).	 	
Overall,	state	surveillance	and	control	implicitly	increased	in	areas	where	it	was	previously	not	
present,	through	roads,	troops,	and	bureaucrats,	and	non-state	areas	were	integrated	into	the	Thai	
state	over	 time	by	 virtue	of	 this	 coercion,	 as	well	 as	 Thai	 in-migration	 to	 the	highlands	 and	 the	
spreading	usage	of	the	Thai	language	and	the	increased	embeddedness	of	its	culture.	This	era	was	
also	marked	by	the	elimination	of	non-state	rivals	such	as	former	KMT	and	communist	insurgents.	 	
Opium,	in	this	era,	can	be	seen	as	less	of	a	commodity	and	more	of	a	proxy	indicator	for	the	
state	 of	 hegemonic	 power	 relations	 (Siriphon,	 2001)	 between	 lowland	 and	 highland,	 shifting	
inexorably	in	favor	of	the	lowlands	by	the	lever	of	alternative	development.	
This	 state	 imposition	 of	 rule	 on	 egalitarian	 highland	 areas,	 touched	 off	 decades	 before	 by	
flight	of	the	KMT,	is	referred	to	as	“development”.	But	in	its	economic	conversion	of	the	highlands	
to	make	it	serve	lowland	interests,	it	may	be	better	described	as	“capitalist	terraforming”.	
6.	Remaining	Opium	Poppy	Cultivation	in	Northwest	Thailand	
While	opium	poppy	 cultivation	declined	 significantly,	 it	did	not	end.	The	majority	of	 known	
opium	 cultivation	 in	 contemporary	 Thailand	 occurs	 in	 Chiang	 Mai’s	 Omkoi	 district:	 an	 area	
bypassed	by	a	half	 century	of	 alternative	development	and	eradication,	 although	 residents	note	
that	 opium	was	 cultivated	 there	 since	 at	 least	 the	 1960s.	 ONCB	 recorded	 significant	 cultivation	
increases	 in	 the	 1990s,	 but	 inexplicably	 stopped	 monitoring	 the	 district	 around	 1998,	 only	
beginning	 again	 in	 2009;	 since	 then,	 cultivation	 rates	 have	 ebbed	 and	 flowed	 in	 a	 manner	
unconnected	to	eradication	impacts	(Jongruck,	2012;	ONCB,	1995-2015).	90%	of	Omkoi	is	classified	
as	a	national	forest	C-Zone	reserve	area	in	order	to	protect	a	watershed	so	important	that	the	Thai	
authorities	consider	it	a	national	security	issue:	people	are	prohibited	from	inhabiting,	cultivating	
or	 otherwise	 utilizing	 it.	 But	 a	 large	 ethnic	 Karen	 population	 of	 swiddening	 cultivators	 has	 lived	
there	since	long	before	the	law	that	outlawed	them	was	created.	They	reside	in	areas	unconnected	
to	the	state	by	road,	with	limited	or	no	access	to	schools,	health	centers,	and	other	services:	they	
are	the	grassroots	cultivators	of	Omkoi’s	opium	supply,	sold	onward	to	opaque	networks	the	state	
is	struggling	to	identify.	While	past	studies	(Hinton,	1983)	allege	that	Karen	don’t	cultivate	opium,	
field	 research	 demonstrates	 that,	 not	 only	 are	 Karen	 growing	 opium	 now,	 but	 they	 have	 been	
growing	in	Omkoi	and	other	areas	of	Chiang	Mai	for	at	least	50	years.	While	most	Karen	no	longer	
engage	 in	 cultivation	 or	 consumption,	 in	 remoter	 parts	 of	 Omkoi	 their	 cultivation	 rates	 are	 the	
highest	 in	 Thailand.	 Thai	 and	 US	 drug	 control	 efforts	 historically	 overlooked	 this	 district,	 and	
possibly	others	hosting	drug	production	not	yet	identified	by	the	state,	because	it	did	not	host	an	
interrelated	 communist	 insurgency,	 nor	 were	 cultivation	 rates	 as	 high	 as	 other	 areas	 of	 NW	
Thailand.	The	government	has	recognized	the	scale	of	cultivation	and	since	2009	has	taken	a	novel	
“network	 governance”	 approach	 to	 suppression	 (Jongruck,	 2012),	 utilizing	 lessons	 from	 former	
cultivation	areas	(Anderson	et	al,	2-15)	
Opium’s	profit	hardly	accrues	 to	 the	 farmer.	Omkoi’s	Karen	grow	opium	because	 they	have	
little	other	choice.	The	encroachment	of	“development”	upon	Omkoi’s	Karen	has	already	occurred	
through	their	growing	reliance	on	lowland	markets	where	currency	is	the	only	form	of	exchange,	
and	opium	 is	 the	highest-	value	cash	crop	around.	Their	 lack	of	citizenship	precludes	 them	from	
land	 tenure	which	might	 incentive	 them	 to	grow	estate	 crops	with	a	 lower	 rate	of	 return	and	a	
longer	 cultivation	 period,	 and	 their	 statelessness	 also	 precludes	 them	 from	 services,	 credit	 and	
other	protections.	Even	if	they	had	citizenship,	their	presence	in	a	C-Zone	reserve	area	still	leaves	
them	“illegal”.	And	if	these	issues	are	all	overcome,	a	stark	truth	remains:	there	is	no	alternative	
crop	 that	 can	 equal	 the	 price	 a	 farmer	 earns	 from	 opium.	 Previous	 programs	 did	 not	 succeed	
because	of	agriculture,	but	because	of	the	increased	presence	of	the	state.	
That	 presence,	 however,	 is	 growing,	 most	 palpably	 in	 eradication,	 law	 enforcement,	 and	
market	 encroachment.	 Omkoi	 is	 1960s	 highland	 Thailand	 in	 microcosm;	 it	 hosts	 the	 historical	
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extension	of	lowland	Padi	state	power	into	an	ungoverned,	untallied,	ephemeral	highland—one	of	
the	last	areas	in	Thailand	to	undergo	this	transformation.	
7.	Conclusion	
Thomas	 Hobbes’s	 Leviathan	 serves	 as	 the	 foundational	 text	 of	 contemporary	 Realist	 state	
philosophies:	people	voluntarily	surrender	themselves	to	the	munificent	state	in	order	to	benefit	
from	its	protections	and	escape	from	the	state	of	nature-	the	unceasing	war	of	‘all	against	all’.	But	
the	reality	is	that	states,	organized	by	violent	entrepreneurs,	came	to	dominate	not	because	they	
brought	 peace	 to	 a	 State	 of	 Nature,	 but	 because	 they	 were	 logistically	 more	 effective	 and	
coercively	more	 brutal	 than	 competing	 entities	 when	 it	 came	 to	 waging	 war,	 holding	 territory,	
mobilizing	labor/	conscription,	and	levying	‘tax’	(Tilly,	1985):	they	held	‘a	decisive	advantage	in	the	
power	 to	 kill”	 (Landes,	 1998:	 88).	 Over	 time,	 firstly	 in	 Europe,	 and	 later,	 in	 the	 colonies,	 these	
exploitative	entities	developed	beyond	their	solely	violent	and	coercive	beginnings;	they	became	
‘legitimate’	by	providing	protection	not	just	from	themselves,	but	also	from	others,	and	they	began	
to	 provide	 services16:	 transportation	 and	 communications	 infrastructure,	 health	 and	 education,	
limited	 welfare	 and	 social	 protection	 mechanisms,	 a	 (usually)	 impartial	 police	 and	 judiciary	
protecting	citizens	from	one	another	and	from	the	state,	and	so	on17.	
Northwestern	Thailand’s	highland	inhabitants	once	avoided	expanding	lowland	empires,	Thai	
as	well	as	Bamar,	by	taking	advantage	of	the	friction	of	topography	that	the	highlands	offered.	In	a	
world	devoid	of	cash,	where	land	was	rich	and	the	people	few,	the	state	was	an	imposition.	But	the	
lowland	coercive	authority	that	these	highland	inhabitants	avoided	has	changed.	
The	Hill	Tribes	have	also	changed:	their	lives	would	not	continue	in	a	vast	outdoor	museum.	
Ethnic	 identities	 have	 always	 been	 in	 flux;	 globalization	 increases	 this	 process.	 Highlanders	 are	
drawn	to	the	state,	and	absorbed	into	its	cash	economy:	they	need	the	tools	that	will	help	them	
better	 navigate	 it.	 These	 tools	 did	 not	 prevent	 highlanders	 from	 becoming	more	 Thai	 and	 less	
Akha,	Karen,	Hmong	or	Lisu;	as	traditional	 lifestyles	change,	painful	decisions	must	be	made,	but	
education,	citizenship,	and	market	skills	were	all	tools	which	highlanders	could	use	to	play	more	of	
a	 part	 in	 those	decisions,	 rather	 than	 simply	have	decisions	made	on	 their	 behalf,	 by	 their	 own	
leaders	or	by	the	state.	Development,	in	this	case,	was	self-defense.	
The	Thai	state	eliminated	its	position	as	a	source	of	opium	for	international	illicit	drug	markets	
decades	 ago.	 That	 success	 occurred	 with	 a	 great	 cultural	 cost	 to	 the	 hill	 tribes:	 the	 symbiotic	
relationship	 between	 people	 and	 land	 ended.	 This	 was,	 and	 remains,	 traumatic.	 Eradication	
worked	 due	 not	 only	 to	 eradication,	 arrests,	 and	 crop	 substitution;	 it	 worked	 because	 the	
imposition	 of	 law	 occurred	 consecutive	 with	 benefits	 to	 hill	 tribes	 such	 as	 the	 provision	 of	
citizenship	and	 the	 rights	and	 responsibilities	 it	embodies;	 the	end	of	 inaccessibility	 through	 the	
establishment	 of	 roads;	 increased	 access	 to	 schools	 and	 health	 care;	 access	 to	markets	 and	 to	
credit,	and	all	manner	of	other	services	and	obligations	that,	together,	constitute	an	ever-evolving	
social	contract.	
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest. 
																																																								
16	 State	theorists	and	propagandists	built	on	Hobbes	and	developed	mythologies	to	justify	state	primacy	by	
expanding	the	notion	of	a	pre-state	war	of	perpetuity	that	the	state	served	as	an	antidote	for;	the	‘necessity’	
of	 states	was	 expanded	 across	 the	 globe,	with	 all	 ‘primitive’	 people	 imagined	 to	 voluntarily	 surrender	 to	
nearby	states	in	order	to	gain	the	peace	and	protection	these	entities	offered.	Whilst	these	claims	may	have	
some	 significant	 historical	 precedents	 (especially	Hobbes,	whose	writings	were	 entirely	 shaped	 by	 the	 30	
Year’s	War,	when	the	war	of	‘all	against	all’	killed	one-third	of	the	population	of	the	German-speaking	lands	
of	Central	Europe:	the	Treaty	of	Westphalia,	which	ended	that	war,	was	the	beginning	of	the	primacy	of	the	
state	system),	they	are	generally	inaccurate	outside	of	European	contexts.	
17	 Contemporary	Thailand	varies	from	a	key	attribute	of	the	contemporary	northern	European	state,	namely	
a	military	that	solely	serves	as	the	implementer	of	civilian-driven	policy	related	to	external	defense.	
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